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 II 
Abstract 
 
Until recently, the Arctic including the Arctic Ocean was only mentioned in the context of 
global warming. However, global warming has led to a thawing of ice that unveiled great 
findings of natural resources. The Arctic is now in the middle of a rapid environmental, 
geopolitical and economic transformation. The planting of the Russian flag by Russian 
researchers in 2007 on the bottom of the Artic Ocean triggered an overwhelming attention 
from other actors and states outside the region. Within a short time, all the Arctic countries, 
the US, Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia, have 
all developed their own Artic strategy and outside actors have voiced their interest for 
influence in the region.  
 One outside actor that has had a great presence in the Arctic region is China. China 
has signed bilateral agreements with several of the Arctic states and shown growing interest 
in the development of Arctic natural resources. Beijing does not have an official Arctic 
strategy, and the Arctic countries, as well as the global community, are curious about what 
China’s intention is in the region.  
  In this thesis, I analyse the Icelandic, Russian and, supposedly, Chinese Arctic 
strategy; what is China’s role in these two Arctic countries’ strategy and what do the activities 
in the Arctic mean to China. 
 The thesis shows that, for both Iceland and Russia, China appears like the partner that 
best suits their strategic priorities. In Iceland’s case, China is the only country that has both 
the technology and the economic capacity to develop Icelandic resources. Chinese presence in 
the Arctic supports two of Iceland’s primary Arctic priorities: the legitimisation of Iceland as 
a coastal Arctic state and preventing the region from becoming an exclusive region just for 
the Arctic littoral states, that are the US, Canada, Russia, Denmark (Greenland), Norway and 
Russia.  
 Russia is undoubtedly the country that possesses the biggest share of the Arctic’s 
riches. Early on, Russia was flirting with international companies with licenses in the Arctic 
region. However, in the light of the Crimea annexation in 2014, the Western sanctions that 
followed ignited a series of bilateral agreements with China that makes it seem like the 
beginning of Russia’s pivot towards the East.  
 Both Iceland and Russia are looking for a partner who can boost their economy and 
help them achieve their strategic goals; develop natural resources and, as a consequence, 
boost socio-economic developments. The findings in this thesis show that Chinese companies 
have a strong advantage in the Arctic compared to other companies. The Chinese companies 
are eager to make foreign investments and have deep enough pockets to support potential 
projects. Simultaneously, their investments receive great support from Beijing, and China’s 
political leaders work actively at improving diplomatic relations and make use of China’s 
strongest card, economic wealth and access to the world’s biggest market.      
  
 
Key Words：China, Russia, Iceland, Arctic, energy politics, geopolitics 
	  
 
 
 
 
 III 
Foreword 
 
I am feeling nostalgic writing this foreword; I have learned and experienced so much 
throughout my education and I feel so blessed being able to meet all the people who I have 
met during this journey.  
 
First I would like to express my gratitude to Koen and Mette: I cannot thank you both enough 
for your immense support and optimism that you have shown me throughout my master 
studies. The advices and feedback you have given me has helped me so much throughout this 
learning process. I also want to thank my supervisor Guo Yi and also professor Liu Wei for 
your understanding and patience while I was studying at Zhejiang University.  
 I am also incredible grateful to Dr Yang Hui Gen for accepting me as an intern at the 
Polar Research Institute of China. I feel so lucky being able to write my thesis under the 
influence of some of China’s foremost experts on Arctic research. A special thank you to 
Egill who helped conceptualise the topic of my thesis, provide continuous flow of feedback 
and who helped me by providing literature.  
My classmates Henrietta and Camilla, thank you girls so much for keeping me 
company and calming me down during my most stressful moments in Hangzhou. We really 
are the last ones standing and I’m so proud of that! Carl, I know you complain about me man-
handling you all the time but you’ll always be my one and only Chinese brother. Thank you 
for all the help I received at Zhejiang University. Tang Qiyan, thank you so much for helping 
me at UiO when I needed it the most, I owe you so much. 
David, Noëlle, Caro, Phoebe, Kathryn and Cam, thank you all for the support and 
advice I received from you during my time in Shanghai. Thank you all for the constructive 
advice on my thesis and David, Kathryn and Cam in particular for proofreading.   
Lastly, my family: my mom and dad, my brother Vy and my sisters MinQin and Minh 
Tam for always telling me to be strong and pursue my dreams.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 IV 
Table of Content 
 
Abstract………………………………………………………………………...II  
 
Foreword…………………………………………………………….………..III  
 
List of abbreviations……………………………...……………………………V 
 
1 Introduction……………………………………………...…………………...1 
1.1 Methodology…...............................................................................................2 
 
2 Chinese Energy Politics………………………………………..…………….4   
2.1 Background: Chinese Foreign Policy…………………………...…………...4  
2.2 Chinese Energy Politics……………………………………………...………7 
2.3 Theory: Geopolitics………………………………………………...………10 
 
3 China and the Arctic……………...…………………………………...……13     
  
4 Iceland...……………………………………………………………...……...16     
4.1 Iceland and the Arctic…………………………………………...………….16 
4.2 Iceland and China………………………………………...………………...19 
 
5 Russia…………………………………………………...……………………22 
5.1 Russia and the Arctic………………………………………...……………..22 
5.2 Russia and China………………………………………………...…………27 
 
6 Conclusion………………………………………………………………...…30 
 
References.……………………………………………………………..……...35 
 V 
List of abbreviations 
 
AC The Arctic Council 
CCP The Chinese Communist Party 
CNPC China National Petroleum Corporation 
CNOOC China National Offshore Oil Corp  
FTA Free Trade Agreement 
UNCLOS The United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 1 
1. Introduction 
  
Whilst the polar ice caps in the Arctic are continuing to melt, the increased traffic and 
regional cooperation between the Arctic coastal states becomes increasingly 
important. The Arctic states are the US, Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, 
Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia. These countries all have portions of their 
territories that lie within the Arctic Circle and hence are all represented in the Arctic 
Council, the current leading forum for Arctic affairs. Arctic littoral states (A5) are the 
US, Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway and Russia, these states not only have 
territories within the Arctic Circle but also hold the rights to exploit the Ocean for 
natural resources within their respective parts of the Arctic.   
The growing range and scope of activities taking place between the eight-
country Artic Council members has rapidly drawn the attention of non-council 
parties, both from sovereign states as well as international organisations, such as the 
EU and NATO. In 2013 China, along with other countries from Asia and Europe 
(India, Italy, Singapore, South Korea and Japan1), was granted an observer seat in the 
council. Although the permanent members of the council were cautious and made 
revisions to the application procedures, the members were still uncertain about the 
role of the observer states. While most observer countries emphasized that they see 
the Arctic as an important environmental zone and as an arena for economic 
opportunities, they put less emphasis on talk related to political and security 
concerns2. 
 
As pointed out by Young, natural sciences are heavily represented in Arctic studies, 
however, in the last few decades; Arctic studies have extended greatly to include 
social sciences. The Arctic has become the new testing ground for constitutional 
issues, as well as giving us a deeper understanding of the role of regimes and 
institutions in achieving sustained cooperation at the international level3.  
This is the reason why I was first drawn to writing about the Arctic region; 
activities in the Arctic are new and on going, its future is unpredictable and all we can 
                                                
1 Arctic Yearbook ”2013 highlights”, http://www.arcticyearbook.com/index.php/2013-highlights, 
accessed 08.05.15 
2 (Solli, Wilson Rowe, & Yennie Lindgren, 2013) 
3 (Young, 1992) 
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do is to try and foresee the future developments of the Arctic by combining different 
forms of analysis. What intrigued me the most was how China became one of the 
earliest and most visible non-Arctic actor in Arctic affairs. 
Much of the literature that exists discussing China in the Arctic specifically 
focuses on Chinese national aspirations in the Artic area, however, there were several 
significant dialogues that were not focused upon within the scholarly articles used for 
this researched; Mainly a closer and more detailed description of Chinese cooperation 
with Arctic states, especially in energy politics. 
My approach rests on a set of hypotheses drawn from existing research. My 
hypotheses are; firstly, Chinese foreign politics centres on energy acquisition, and 
thus, Chinese politics in the Arctic is driven by energy politics. As a big power 
without territorial claims in the Arctic, China needs to use other measures to make 
sure that they too get a share of the Arctic’s riches. Some scholars have suggested that 
China might go as far as using military measures to achieve its aspirations in the 
Arctic. However, I agree with most other scholars that China will rather try to reach 
consensus through bilateral agreements, which has been in line with Chinese foreign 
policy strategy throughout the last 3 decades.  
Secondly, China historically has not been an aggressive super power that has 
pushed itself onto the Arctic states; the Arctic states have just as much, if not more, to 
gain from cooperation than China. International media often creates an image of 
China as an aggressive actor that has no scruples while in search for global resources 
to satisfy its energy hunger. China tries to keep a low profile and emphasises again 
and again that they are only interested in win-win cooperation. That is not to say that 
there are no politics involved at all; most of the joint energy exploitation projects 
occur between national energy companies and with these companies politics and 
economy have stronger bonds than in other multinational projects.  
 
1.1 Methodology  
 
My general method will be focusing on qualitative research methods, as I wish to gain 
an in-depth understanding of Chinese energy activities in the Arctic, with special 
focus on two Arctic countries; Iceland and Russia. I wish to test my hypothesises by 
crosschecking Icelandic and Russian Arctic strategy with Chinese energy politics. If 
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the political priorities of China and the Arctic state matches, it is clear that a stronger 
incentive to cooperate occur, and consequently, China’s visibility and role in the 
Arctic increases. 
  I chose these two countries, as I wanted to see how Chinese energy policy is 
employed with different policies and strategies of two distinctly different countries. 
Russia, a large super power with abundant natural resources; and Iceland, a small 
state whose natural resource reserves are miniscule in comparison. Additionally, 
Iceland’s experience with natural resource exploration is far more limited than energy 
giant Russia. 
In my thesis I wish to analyse the Icelandic, Russian and Chinese Arctic strategy, 
because of the lack of an official strategy I will base this on Chinese activities in the 
Arctic the last 15 years. My research question is as followed: How does China and 
Chinese politics fit with these two Arctic countries’ strategy and what sort of role do 
the activities in the Arctic have in Chinese energy politics? 
In the last decade there has been a great amount of academic literature published 
about the Arctic and more is to be published as developments within the Arctic 
continues. I will also use quite many news articles in my thesis as they have the latest 
updates on Arctic developments.  
In sum, most of my data will be a collection of peer-reviewed literature, policy 
documents, and media articles.  
 
Chapter two will be divided in two, one historical background and one theoretical 
part. I will begin with a historical review of Chinese foreign diplomacy starting from 
the period of Deng Xiaoping. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is internationally 
known for being flexible and adapting quickly to new challenges. This historical 
review will not only show us the priorities but also the challenges that have faced 
Chinese foreign diplomacy in the last 3 decades. The reason behind my choice in this 
specific time frame is due to the reforms enacted in this period and there on going 
effects and influence on today’s policies. From Deng, domestic Chinese diplomacy 
promoted economic growth, which quickly influenced China’s foreign policy, as 
China became increasingly dependant on energy to sustain its economic growth.  
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For the theoretical part I will use Saul B Cohen’s work “Geopolitics: the 
Geography of International Relations”4 as a basis. Much of the scepticism and 
circumspection against China and Chinese corporations is the backdrop of a global 
world that is experiencing a great geopolitical shift. Will China make a great 
geopolitical shift in the global context? Does China have the ability to influence the 
geopolitical changes in the Arctic? 
As for now, the Arctic is still a conflict-free region, but given the attention the 
region has been afforded in the last decade, it is without doubt that a new political 
club is developing among the Arctic states. As China sees itself as a “near Arctic 
state”, Beijing will most likely make sure that China will not be excluded from 
activities in this region, but to what extent?  
 
The third chapter will discuss Chinese aspirations in the Arctic. This chapter will be a 
general overview of Chinese interests in the Arctic while a more detailed description 
of Chinese activities with each of the Arctic states will follow in latter chapters. There 
are 8 Arctic states, but I will focus only on Iceland and Russia. The reason I have 
chosen these two states is because China has been most active with the states holding 
controlling access to Arctic natural resources, as emphasised earlier is a Chinese 
priority. Another reason is that because of the scope of the thesis I wish to narrow it 
down to these nations only.  
 
The fourth and fifth chapter will be about my two focus countries, which are my case 
studies, Iceland and Russia respectively. In both chapters I will begin with an 
introduction to each countries’ Arctic strategy and the motivation behind it. Then I 
will analyse how China has become their biggest partner in the Arctic based on these 
strategies.  
 
2 Chinese Energy Politics    
2.1 Background: Chinese Foreign Policy  
 
 
                                                
4 (2009) 
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As China is becoming increasingly more active in global activities, the rest of the 
world is anxious to know Chinese foreign policy strategies, as these policies can give 
us an idea of what kind of image China wishes to promote abroad and what sort of 
strategy Beijing wishes to pursue.  
Within 30 years, China has transformed from being an isolated country to 
becoming one of the world’s biggest economic markets. China’s power 
internationally weighs heavily on this; access to the Chinese market. This 
transformation is largely due to the change in foreign policy since the late 1970s. 
Before the 1970s, Chinese politics were dominated by a single political actor, the 
Chinese Communist Party (Zhongguo Gongchandang 中国共产党). The decision 
making process in Chinese foreign policy from Mao to Deng Xiaoping was more 
centralised than in other states, though after Deng, Chinese foreign policy would see 
the increase of more actors, for instance from the business sector or other interest 
groups5. China developed its foreign policy in a time of globalisation and 
interdependence, and in these circumstances it is difficult to separate between 
domestic political interests and foreign diplomacy. In shaping its foreign policy, 
Beijing needed to develop a strategy that would maintain the socioeconomic reforms 
domestically, whilst at the same time oversee China’s rapid rise in the international 
arena6. Since the late 1970s and early 1980s, China was in search of its own 
independent foreign policy, as a consequence Chinese foreign policy has had three 
phases of development: 
1. Pragmatism: in the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward, China was to 
undergo an economic reconstruction. Chinese foreign policy in the late 1970s 
focused less on Mao’s political ideologies and more on pragmatism. Deng 
Xiaoping developed a new thinking where a pragmatic approach to market 
economy was incorporated with the CCP’s socialist ideology, thus maintaining 
the dominant role of the party. China was to be opened up for international 
trade and to go through a liberalisation of the Chinese market. Before China 
could enter the global market, financial assistance from abroad was necessary, 
hence Deng opened the door of the Chinese market to foreign investments7. 
                                                
5 (Lanteigne, 2013) 
6 (Lanteigne, 2013) 
7 (Lanteigne, 2013, p. Location 722 of 6889) 
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2. Building a stable periphery: improving relations with superpowers and 
immediate neighbours. Before his retirement, Deng Xiaoping emphasised the 
importance of maintaining regional stability, a task that was given to his 
successor Jiang Zemin. Under Jiang’s leadership, China gained increasingly 
more attention globally. Chinese foreign policy makers would now have to 
assess and evaluate China’s role in international politics. From the 1990s, 
China emerged as a “joiner” and would participate more on the international 
arena and join international organisations. In order for China to continue with 
its domestic reforms, peacetime and a stable environment were necessary. 
From the 1990s China sought to increase its relations with its immediate 
neighbours as well as the super powers of the US and USSR/Russian 
Federation. During the late 1990s, Beijing began to promote a new policy that 
would characterize contemporary.  
3. Chinese foreign politics: the “go out” policy (zouchuqu走出去). The purpose 
of the policy is to encourage Chinese enterprises to invest overseas. To 
Beijing, Chinese investments abroad are just as important as domestic 
investments from overseas. Enterprises are encouraged to go abroad, invest 
and also bring expertise and experience home to China and Chinese products. 
Thus, Beijing wishes for Chinese enterprises to join the international market, 
to create global brands and participate in projects with foreign partners8. In 
accordance with the policy, Beijing’s first step was becoming a member of the 
World Trade Organisation in 20019.  
An important difference between this phase and the previous is that unlike 
Deng Xiaoping who was able to consolidate power, Jiang Zemin needed more 
support from several political actors. And consequently, from the 1990s, the 
decision making process in China’s foreign policy became more complex10. 
4. Expansion and reconstruction: expansion of China’s geopolitical interests and 
reconstruction of China’s foreign policy institutions. From 2008 and early 
2011, China surpasses Japan and becomes the world’s second biggest 
economy after the US. Under the leadership of Hu, the institutions responsible 
                                                
8 (Lanteigne, 2013, p. Location 957 of 6889; Shambaugh, 2013) 中华人民共和国中央人民政府《更
好地实施“走出去”战略》 
9 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm 
10 (Lanteigne, 2013) 
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for the development of China’s foreign policy were reconstructed if necessary 
to adjust to changing domestic and international circumstances. Out-dated 
ideas were discarded and old concepts were brought back for reviewing11. 
Under Deng and Jiang, Chinese foreign policy makers were more cautious, 
and followed Deng Xiaoping’s advice on conducting foreign policy as if 
“crossing the rivers by feeling the stones”12. Under Hu, China took a more 
active role in international politics, instead of just reacting to international 
challenges, China is now more active in improving its international status by 
engaging internationally through unilateral and multilateral approaches13. 
In sum, after the later 1970s until today, economic development was and is the 
supreme goal in Chinese domestic and foreign policy. Chinese policy-making shows 
more pragmatism on the behalf of ideology and improving diplomatic relations has 
become a priority. In order for Chinese domestic politics to be more compatible with 
global economy, building foreign economic relations is a necessity. This is 
particularly important in a Chinese context where much of Chinese economy is in 
state control14.    
 Another important change compared to the times of Mao and Deng is how the 
policy-making process in Chinese foreign diplomacy opens the way for more actors 
resulting in policy-making becoming less centralised. An important reason for this 
being China emerging as a new great power: as any other great power, Chinese 
foreign policies are becoming more distinct and numerous as China grows in strength 
and capability15. 
 
2.2 Chinese Energy Politics 
 
The politics ever since the reforms of the 1970s have made China the world’s largest 
trader and second largest economy16. Additionally, China is the world's most 
populous country with a fast-growing economy that has led it to be the largest energy 
                                                
11 (Lanteigne, 2013, p. Location 257 of 6889) 
12 (Lanteigne, 2013, pp. 171, Location 5629 of 6889) 
13 (Lanteigne, 2013, pp. 35, Location 1231 of 6889) 
14 (Lanteigne, 2013, pp. 5, Location 346 of 6889) 
15 (Lanteigne, 2013, pp. 1, Location 223 of 6889) 
16 “Why Trade With China: An Arctic Perspective: China’s interest in the Arctic makes perfect 
economic sense”, The Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/why-trade-with-china-an-arctic-
perspective/ [Accessed 14.04.2015] 
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consumer and producer in the world. China was a net oil exporter until 1993, and by 
2009 it became the world’s second-largest net importer of crude oil and petroleum 
products. EIA projects that China is likely to surpass the United States in net oil 
imports on an annual basis by 2014 as U.S. oil production and Chinese oil demand 
increase simultaneously17. This projection was fulfilled in March 2014 as China 
became the world’s largest net importer of petroleum and other liquid fuels18  
           
Table 1. Top ten annual net oil importers, 2013  
 
China is Asia Pacific’s biggest producer of oil, however, the production growth has 
not kept pace with demand growth during this period. Trends show a long-term 
decline of oil production, this will lead and has led to a rapid increase of energy 
import. While it has made China extremely influential in world energy markets, it has 
also left China very vulnerable19.  
As we can see in the previous sub-chapter, Chinese policy makers are still unsure 
about which image they wish to portray on the international political scene. But based 
on Chinese activities broad, it is safe to say that China’s increased reliance on 
                                                
17 “China”, U.S. Energy Information Administration. http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH  
accessed 14.05.2015 
18 ”China is now the world’s largest net importer of petroleum and other liquid fuels”, U.S. Energy 
Information Administration. http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=15531# accessed 
13.05.2015  
19 “China”, U.S. Energy Information Administration. http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH  
accessed 14.04.2015 
(Brown & Wu, 2003) 
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imported energy is influencing Chinese foreign policy and that energy policy is a 
priority in Chinese foreign diplomacy.  
Economic growth is generally linked with increased energy consumption, and as 
we can see in table 1，several of China’s neighbouring countries are economic giants 
in Asia and consequently, these countries like China are dependent on oil import. 
Unlike the US, who is increasingly becoming more energy self-sufficient, China finds 
herself more vulnerable to disruption of energy import.  
 As China was during the 1970s and 1980s self-sufficient on oil, and state 
central planners regulated prices, the tumultuous episode in the oil world market 
during the 1970s and 1980s did not hit China as hard as it did for the rest of the world. 
In the aftermath, while the other big economies adjusted their policies and strategies 
to be better prepared against a new crisis, Chinese leaders could afford being 
indifferent to conflicts in the Middle East or other oil-producing regions. In recent 
years however, China has satisfied its energy hunger with oil from a few Middle-
Eastern countries, in particular Oman, Yemen and Iran20. Overall, Middle Eastern oil 
accounts for over 54% of China’s total foreign import, 75% of Asian import, and at 
the same time, Asia is the Middle East’s largest customer21. Trends show an 
increasing Chinese dependency upon Middle-Eastern oil, and thus, with energy 
security in mind, the Chinese government sought to reduce its dependence on an 
unstable supply from an unstable region in which China cannot exert direct influence.  
Energy security is very broadly, the assurance of adequate energy supplies to 
maintain the national economy at ”normal” levels. If growth is considered normal, 
then security is likely to require some growth in guaranteed energy supplies over 
time22. Willrich makes clear that if a great power is not self-sufficient on energy 
resources, only one obvious strategy is available: ”by strengthening its guarantees of 
foreign supplies23.” Additionally, if the power becomes too dependent on foreign 
supply of energy resources, it exposes itself to countless security risks.   
With this in mind, in order to meet its rising domestic demand for oil and 
maintain energy security, China has taken three strategic steps24:  
1. Diversify its importing sources: signing of bilateral agreements with energy-
                                                
20 (Jaffe & Lewis, 2002, p. 119) 
21 (Brown & Wu, 2003, p. 1) (Lai, 2007) 
22 (Willrich, 1978, p. 67) 
23 (Willrich, 1978, p. 69&186) 
24 (Brown & Wu, 2003; Jaffe & Lewis, 2002; Lai, 2007; Lanteigne, 2014) 
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rich countries beyond Asia Pacific and the Middle East.  
2. Foreign investments: in line with the previously mentioned “go out” policy, 
the Chinese government has heavily promoted overseas oil investments.  
3. Infrastructure: Investing in pipeline projects and exploring shipping 
alternatives to secure the safety of imported energy resources.  
 
2.3 Theory: Geopolitics 
 
When examining foreign policy, one also needs to examine how the foreign policy, or 
geostrategy, of a state reflects the underlying geopolitical reality. As Grygiel argues; 
“states wield their power not on a billiard table, but on seas, through mountains, and 
across plains, and their success depends above all on their ability to match their 
foreign policy to the underlying geopolitical situation”25. Geopolitics is “a 
combination of geological features (e.g. natural resources) with human activity (e.g. 
production and communication technology) that alters the value of places” or more 
simply put, it is the study of how factors such as geography, economics, and 
demography can influence not only political decision-making but also particularly 
states foreign policy26. It helps to generate a simple model of the world, which can be 
used in the decision-making process when shaping foreign and security policies. It 
ranks countries and regions based on geographical significance and separates allies 
form enemies. Additionally, geopolitics can also inform the audience of the political 
world system27.   
Geopolitics, as theory and an instrument, has the potential to strategize and visualize 
global territory and resources. However, throughout most of its history as an 
academic subject, it has been condemned by most scholars.  
  First coined by the Swedish scholar Rudolf Kjellen in 1899, geopolitics as an 
academic subject had a realistic approach, putting emphasis on the condition of states 
based on territory and resources. Geopolitics as a subject developed based on two 
important factors; global trade was on the rise and nations became increasingly 
interconnected. Second, imperial nations were more aggressively expanding towards 
                                                
25 (Grygiel, 2006, p. ix) 
26 (ibid.) 
27 (Dodds, 2014, p. Location 560 of 3072) 
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new territories28. For nations to prosper, states need to accumulate more resources and 
new territories. However, unlike later German interpretation, geopolitics of this period 
was preoccupied with colonial territories29.  
  In continental Europe of the early 1900s, in particular mid-war, geopolitics 
had a resurrection in German academia. Karl Haushofer, a professor of geography 
from University of Munich, developed a geopolitics that has a greater degree of moral 
detachment than earlier. He indicates in his work that the state is an organism that has 
to face geographical realities. The world is ultra-competitive and resources are scarce, 
in order to survive a nation needs to prioritize national self-interest that should be 
territory and resources30. Under Nazi-Germany, several of Haushofers terms, such as 
Lebensraum, was reintroduced and used in the Nazi ideology. Haushofer himself did 
not prescribe to Nazi doctrine, and unlike Hitler, he did not put an emphasis on the 
role of humans in the course of history, but part of his works was used in a manner 
that would stain geopolitics as an academic subject.  
  After World War II until the 1970s geopolitics as a field was totally absent 
from academia; it was a subject associated with policies of genocide, racism and 
expansionism31. This absence gave rise to other theories such as international 
relations despite bearing the same traits as geopolitics32. However, in times when 
there’s great power shift or energy becomes prominent in world politics, geopolitics 
reappear. It happened during the 1970s oil crisis, and it happened again now after 
China and India became rising oil consumers33.  
 
Early geopolitical writers tried to paint a geographical reality and make predictions 
about the future for a country, usually at the expense of others. Later geopolitics 
emphasized other geographical ways of representing and understanding the world. It 
was important to understand, from a geographic standpoint, the geopolitical 
differences and use this knowledge to balance out the differences34. Saul B. Cohen 
wrote his book “Geography and Politics in a Divided World” in 1974, in a time when 
geopolitics saw its revival in academia. Here, he emphasises that “geopolitical 
                                                
28 (ibid., Location 798 of 3072) 
29 (ibid., Location 856,879 of 3072) 
30 (ibid., Location 890 of 3072) 
31 (Dodds, 2014, Location 764 of 3072) 
32 (Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006) 
33 (Claes & Moe, 2014) 
34 (Dodds, 2014, Location 1192 of 3072) 
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analysis does not predict the timing of events, crises, and flash points that force 
radical changes in the geopolitical map.” Instead, geopolitical analysis puts more 
focus on the changes within the geopolitical system, as well as conditions of 
geopolitical changes that policy makers need to be more aware off35.  
 As mentioned previously, China’s foreign policy has been shaped in a time of 
globalization and global interdependence. Many writers today claim that geopolitics 
has lost its importance in a time of globalization; there is no need to have direct 
command over routes and resources in order to accumulate wealth and have leverage 
over others. States can prosper by simply tapping into the market and gain access to 
both resources and routes. However, most geopolitical writers argue that the market 
can never completely replace exclusive control of resources36.  
China’s presence in the Arctic has to some been interpreted as a threat to the 
geopolitical environment in the region. According to Cohen, having the ability to alter 
geopolitics means one possess power. Geopolitics is about power, but what is true 
power and how do you utilize your power most efficiently? Cohen separates power in 
four pillars37: 
1. Overwhelming military strength and the willingness to use it 
2. Surplus economic energy to enable a state to provide aid and invest in 
other states 
3. Ideological leadership that serves as a model for other nations 
4. A cohesive system of governance 
Based on these pillars he concludes that the US is the world’s currently only great 
super power; the US still has the strongest military and the world’s biggest military 
budget, in addition being the world’s biggest economy. And finally, the US has a 
political system and an ideology that is acknowledged and respected globally. China 
is a rising military power and its military budget continues to increase, but its military 
power is still lagging behind the US. China, unlike the US, concentrates its military 
power close to its border. China instead relies heavily on economic trade and uses 
investments to extend its influence. China’s deep pockets has led to different kinds of 
purchases or investments in natural resources in different parts of the world. 
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However, these initiatives have led to political pressures as these actions have often 
been met with suspicion and opposition. Cohen concludes that even though there is a 
possibility that China one day might become the worlds leading military and 
economic power, Chinese lack of soft power will hamper China from being the most 
influential super power. In his overview he mentions that soft power is increasingly 
becoming a very powerful tool and when comparing China with the US, the latter 
holds the lead in soft power38. 
3 China and the Arctic  
 
China’s dependence on energy import has implications for its foreign behaviour. 
Energy need in particular is an important component of China’s international 
relations. Thus, the primary objective of China’s foreign policy is resource 
acquisition39. Oil consumption in China is currently estimated at 9.9 million barrels 
per day, half of which is imported. Because of the nations limited domestic-resource 
base, China has become dependent on foreign resources, and identifies oil as a 
component of China’s national economic security since 200340. Chinese lack of 
transparency, aggression in their quest for energy recourses combined with mutual 
distrust between China and the West might result in an unfortunate outcome for 
China. However, compared to the West, which has over 100 years of history in 
extracting and trading energy worldwide, China is very much a latecomer in terms of 
handling the norms of international energy business. Chinese dependence on oil and 
energy has spread Chinese economic and diplomatic presence to wherever there is 
spare supply41.  
 
In recent years, as the ice in the Arctic continues to melt and the riches of the Arctic 
becomes more evident, China has been very active in strengthening its ties with 
Arctic countries. China prioritises strong diplomatic ties to the Arctic by having the 
largest embassy in Iceland’s capital Reykjavik, it invests strongly on science by 
maintaining a large scientific research presence in Spitsbergen, and just recently 
celebrated its 25th anniversary in polar research.  
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Additionally, China operates the world’s largest nonnuclear icebreaker, Snow 
Dragon (Xue Long, 雪龙), and it has plans to build another icebreaker to accompany 
the Snow Dragon42. In spring 2013, China became an observer member of the Arctic 
Council, a high level intergovernmental forum “to provide a means for promoting 
cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States 43. Shortly after, 
China signed a Free Trade Agreement with Iceland, China’s first with a European 
country44. Clearly, China sees the Arctic not only as an environmental zone, but also 
as an arena for economic opportunities. Chinese interest in the Arctic is crosscutting 
and the Chinese want to preserve the Arctic as well as exploit the opportunities in the 
Arctic. Because China is not a littoral and/or Arctic state, China is worried that the 
Arctic state may change their open, legal-minded tune and exclude non-Arctic states. 
Therefore, Chinese scholars have expressed different arguments to enhance Chinese 
development in the High North45. 
 
In order to legitimise its role in the Arctic region, Chinese news articles formulate 
China as a “near-Arctic country” and an “Arctic stakeholder”46.  According to Yuan, 
Chinese interest in the Arctic has significantly increased because climate changes in 
the Arctic have a direct influence on Chinese ecosystem, and pose a great threat to 
Chinese “food security”47. China has been attempting to keep a low profile in the 
Arctic but simultaneously promoting heavily its research activities in the region. 
However, its efforts to become an observer in the Arctic Council and its interests in 
developing Arctic energy resources and minerals have caused concerns about China’s 
true ambitions. The Arctic states, both big and small are apprehensive about Chinese 
presence and question whether China will challenge the interests of Arctic states48. In 
a public opinion survey made among the population in eight of the Arctic countries, 
China was actually the country the Arctic population least wanted to co-operate with, 
Russia being the exception as they listed the US at the bottom. In the past two years, 
                                                
42 (Kraska, 2011; Yang, 31.07.2012) 
43 ”About the Artic Council”, Arctic Council web pages, 07.04.2011, (accessed 09.12.13) 
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/about-arctic-council 
44 ("The Rice Man Comet," April 20th 2013) 
45 (Solli et al., 2013) 
46 (Hellström, 2014); 中国成为北极理事会观察员国 没表决权有参与权, 新华网，16.05.2013 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/tech/2013-05/16/c_124717352.htm ;中国成为北极理事会正式观察员, 新
华网，16.05.2013 http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-05/16/c_124717587.htm 
47 陆俊元 (2011, p. 2) 
48 (Hellström, 2014) 
 15 
China has been more assertive in its approach towards the Arctic, and has expressed 
very clearly that it wishes to exploit natural resources in the region49. It has also been 
proposed by scholars from Shanghai Ocean University to use the Arctic Council to 
promote, among other, energy cooperation between the member states50.  
  China was among the first countries to apply for an observer seat, they did so 
already in 2006 and since 2007, China has been an ad hoc observer of the Arctic 
Council. Despite the fact that Chinese officials have left no comments on the issue, 
Chinese scholars and officials have privately been quite aggressive in their statements 
about the Arctic Council’s treatment of China51. Statements made by Admiral Yin 
Zhou from the People’s Liberation Army Navy represents the general sentiment of 
China’s Arctic policies so far; "The Arctic belongs to all the people around the world 
as no nation has sovereignty over it. China must play an indispensable role in Arctic 
exploration as we have one-fifth of the world's population”52. China claims that the 
Arctic is “common heritage”, thus implying that the “Arctic Five” (the littoral states 
of Russia, Norway, Denmark, Canada and the U.S.) cannot resolve the territorial 
sovereignty dispute without regards to other countries53. 
China’s present Arctic policy and research agenda are based on the premise 
that, as more and more countries becomes aware of the riches in the Arctic, the more 
the Arctic countries will restrain external pressure, it will eventually lead to China 
having no choice but to “look after its own rights and what it perceives as its right”54.  
Chinese officials state that the territorial rights of the Arctic countries are clear 
and that China will cooperate with the respective countries through bilateral 
agreements. The Chinese “respect the sovereignty of the Arctic states”, and that the 
land, islands and coastal areas belong to the Arctic states. On the issue of territorial 
control of the Arctic region, the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), signed by every Arctic state, with the exception of the U.S), remains as 
the most comprehensive international legal framework for governance of state 
activities over the world’s oceans, including the Arctic Ocean55. And although 
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Chinese assistant minister of foreign affairs claims that China respects the Arctic 
states legal rights in accordance with UNCLOS, many Chinese scholars believe that 
UNCLOS does not safeguard China’s Arctic interests. Therefore, both Chinese 
scholars and officials have expressed that even if the Arctic states do get their 
territorial claims approved by the UN, the considerations of the global community 
also need be taken into consideration. So it has happened that Chinese scholars 
publically criticized the legal framework of the Arctic Council and have instead 
emphasized the “common heritage” when referring to the ocean that is not claimed by 
any states56.  
 To sum up, China has three main interests in the region: research in the Arctic, 
the economic potential in the development of sea routes and energy resources. The 
Chinese Arctic aspirations with Iceland and Russia will be covered in the following 
chapters. 
4 Iceland  
4.1 Iceland and the Arctic 
 
Keflavik September 2006 marked the end of an era and the beginning of a new in 
Icelandic foreign policy57. As a NATO member but having no standing military of its 
own, Iceland signed in 1951 a bilateral defence agreement with the United States. The 
US military made arrangements for Iceland's defence on behalf of NATO from the 
naval military base on Keflavik. The US still provide for Iceland’s defence but after 
fall 2006, the US military no longer has any personnel on Icelandic soil. Within a 
month, all American military personnel on Iceland were sent home, ending a 45 years 
of American military operations in support of the defence of Iceland58. 
 For decades, Icelandic foreign policy focused on maintaining the USA–
Iceland relationship and keeping the US at Keflavik. When the US military finally 
left, it was clear to the Icelandic government that it was time for a new foreign policy, 
one that was not too dependent on one single nation. In 2008, Iceland was also struck 
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by a major economic recession and the Icelandic government then sought to pursue a 
strategy that would streamline both its domestic and foreign policy that would bring 
Iceland an economic recovery59.   
 
The Arctic appeared to be an obvious arena; Iceland has been active in the Arctic for 
decades, its location made Iceland an important strategic partner for the American 
military during the Cold war, additionally, it is also a founding member of the Arctic 
Council. Iceland has been active in the AC and even held chairmanship in 2003 – 
2004. Moreover, the country also has a long history of polar research and has hosted a 
number of international Arctic conferences60. With this background, Iceland sought to 
integrate the Arctic in its domestic and foreign policy.  
  Icelandic Arctic ambitions began already before the closing of Keflavik and 
the economic recession. In 2006, a report from the Icelandic Foreign Ministry “North 
meets North: Navigation and the Future of the Arctic” proposed that Iceland would be 
a hub for transport through the Trans-arctic Shipping Route, based on the Icelandic 
strategic geographical location ‘in the middle of the Northern Atlantic’61.  
 Three years later, the government issued a new report that aimed for a broader 
multi-functional role for Iceland in the Arctic. The document had six key priorities 
ranging from social to military priorities. Iceland had to prioritise international 
security and resource development in particular as it is “the only country” located 
“entirely within the Arctic region”, and whose economic development depends 
heavily on the resources in the Arctic62.   
  Approved by Althingi in March 28 2011, Iceland is one of the last Arctic 
countries to finalise and officially publicise its Arctic strategy. In the “Parliamentary 
Resolution on Iceland’s Arctic Strategy”, the government lists 12 principles 
concerning “climate change, environmental issues, natural resources, navigation and 
social development as well as strengthening relations and cooperation with other 
States and stakeholders on the issues facing the region”. Protection of environment, 
supporting the rights of indigenous people, improve relations with other Arctic states, 
promote Arctic research and safeguarding security interest are among some of the 
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principles listed. Of these twelve, Iceland’s core priorities are as followed; 
“promoting and strengthening the Arctic Council as the most important consultative 
forum on Arctic issues” and through the Arctic Council resolve international issues; 
and lastly, “securing Iceland's position as a coastal State within the Arctic region”63. 
Iceland’s current Arctic strategy emphasizes open and inclusive Arctic dialogue, the 
government wishes to be an equal player in the Artic, a region where super powers 
such as Russia and the US have a strong position. To legitimise these ambitions, 
Iceland is actively using multilateral institutions and international conventions to 
emphasise Iceland’s position as a ‘coastal state’. In 2009, Iceland had a shift of 
leadership and the new coalition government of the Social Democrat Alliance and the 
Left-Greens had two foreign policy processes; EU membership and a stronger pivot 
towards the Arctic. The last proposal was received by a great support by the Icelandic 
elite and the governmental apparatus devoted governmental resources on exploring 
what sort of opportunities Iceland has in the region64.   
Iceland’s pivot towards the Arctic was a natural direction in Icelandic policy shift. 
The developments of natural resources will not only boost the Icelandic economy, 
which is still trying to recover from the economic collapse in 2008, but also legitimise 
an Icelandic voice in a region that is gaining an increased interest globally.  
 In 2008, the Arctic 5, met in the city of Ilulissat, Greenland to discuss the 
future of the Arctic region. The topics on the agenda were “climate change and the 
melting of ice have a potential impact on vulnerable ecosystems, the livelihoods of 
local inhabitants and indigenous communities, and the potential exploitation of 
natural resources”. The Ilulissat Declaration, which is the product of the meeting, 
stresses that it is necessary with “ a new comprehensive international legal regime to 
govern the Arctic Ocean”. This Declaration is also to be used as the foundation for 
responsible management for “the 5 coastal States and other users of this Ocean”65. 
After this meeting, Iceland has been promoting very heavily the importance of the 
AC. Iceland’s strategy is to avoid being excluded and pushing the AC to be the 
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preeminent Arctic forum66. Despite government reports claiming that Iceland is the 
only country whose territory is entirely in the Arctic region or formulating Iceland’s 
position as “a Coastal State”, the Ilulissat Declaration clearly does not include Iceland 
in its definition of an Arctic coastal state. According to Hastings, small states such as 
Iceland tend to turn to multilateral institutions as they see these institutions as 
‘creating norms which constrain the behaviour and ambitions of great powers’. 
Institutions such as the AC enable Iceland to have a stronger standing against great 
powers67. As a matter of fact, Russian officials have supported a stronger role for the 
AC, and at the same time, suggested that through the AC, a regionally determined set 
of rules for the development of the region is to be developed68.  
 In sum, the development of Iceland’s Arctic strategy was a result of three 
factors: 
1. The search for a new focus in Icelandic foreign policy, additionally, a policy 
that would simultaneously promote domestic economic growth in the 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.   
2. The desire to partake in the new role of the Arctic and the possibilities that 
emerged in the region.  
3. The need to manage the changes and risks in Arctic geopolitics, environment 
and security.  
 
4.2 Iceland and China 
 
Among the smaller Arctic states, Iceland is without any doubt the country in the 
Arctic in which China is most involved with. According to the 2012 statistical report 
from Polar Research Institute of China, in 2009, Iceland was the only Arctic 
“territory” in which China had direct investments69. 
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In a global context, even in the Arctic, Iceland is a small state with its populations at 
only 317,35170. Iceland’s strategic position in the Arctic may make Iceland an 
important Arctic player in the decades ahead. Its location is actually right outside the 
Arctic Circle, which explains why according to the Ilulissat Declaration, it is not an 
Arctic coastal state in the formal sense. However, Iceland has been able to put itself 
on the map by promoting itself as a meeting place and gate opener for actors with 
interests in the Arctic71.  
Several Asian nations have expressed interest in the Arctic; they are no different from 
other actors approaching the Arctic. The interests in the Arctic is mostly driven by 
commercial interests but also for issues in a more global scale such as climate change, 
sustainable development, and strengthened research efforts72.    
China is the Asian country with the most visible interests in the Arctic, and in Iceland 
specifically. Since the mid-2000s, the diplomatic relationship between Iceland and 
China did not only increase but also deepened. Iceland became the first European 
country to sign a bilateral Chinese–Iceland free trade agreement (FTA) in April of 
2013. The European Union remains Iceland’s biggest trading partner, but China is 
now Iceland’s fourth biggest importing country and the biggest trading partner in 
Asia. Iceland is a small state compared to China, in population, GDP, and 
geopolitical/economic power. Icelandic export to China in 2012, consisted mostly of 
fish worth some €47,6 million to China. And in return, Iceland imported some €264 
million in goods and services from China73. 
While in Iceland, China has carried three main overtures; political, scientific and 
economic. These have been received a favourably among the elite in Iceland. Among 
the elite, there is a strong belief that the changes in the Arctic are “everyone’s 
business”. According to Lunde, this is a very typical Nordic mind set;  
Nordic countries are pragmatic institutionalists with realist flair. They acknowledge 
that recent developments, including climate change, trade, shipping, and the 
development of natural resources, serve to globalize the Arctic. The Asian countries 
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have come to the Arctic to stay, and the Nordics believe it is better to integrate them 
into regional affairs (at a given level of involvement) than to ostracize them and risk 
the formation of potentially unhelpful alliances of non-Arctic states74. 
The impact of the climate changes in the Arctic will not affect the Arctic states alone, 
and this is a view that the Icelandic share with the Chinese. The involvement of Asian 
actors will also increase and strengthen the visibility of the Arctic. And more 
importantly, Asian participation will strengthen Arctic institutions; the importance of 
AC will increase and prevent an emergence of an alternative forum75. 
In research, Chinese participation has also been positively received. Scientific 
cooperation with China is perceived as a way to leverage existing scientific resources, 
and at the same time, a way to track the global climate change trend76.  
  While political and scientific overtures have gained little attention from the 
public, the elite and the public have very mixed reactions towards Chinese economic 
overtures. Iceland finds it hard to attract foreign direct investment, especially after the 
global financial crisis. The core of Sino-Icelandic economic cooperation is the 
common interest that includes fishing, shipping, and recently oil and gas 
development.  
 In 2014, China National Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC), China’s biggest 
offshore oil and gas developer, became the first Chinese firm licensed to look for oil 
in the Arctic. CNOOC will operate with two Arctic firms, Eykon Energy (Iceland) 
and Petoro Iceland AS (Norway) in the Icelandic Dreki area of the Jan Mayen ridge. 
In this operation CNOOC holds a majority stake of 60 percent77.   
  Chinese investments are thus most welcome in Iceland, however, only if it 
helps Icelandic industries. In 2012, the Chinese investor, Huang Nubo tried to bid for 
a piece of Icelandic land to build an eco-tourism project. This bidding received a lot 
of attention among the Icelandic population and the response was not in Huang’s 
favour78. As mentioned above, as a small state, Iceland is driven to seek alliances, but 
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like its Nordic countries, Iceland is wary of Chinese strategic objectives in Arctic. 
Icelandic experts agree that in order for Iceland to prosper from Arctic involvement, 
Iceland needs to open up for international partners. They do however emphasise that 
Iceland needs to have a clear picture of who these partners should be79.  
 In sum, Iceland is pursuing a strategy that can boost Icelandic economy and at 
the same time bolster Iceland’s status in the Arctic as a ‘coastal state’. The economic 
connections with China have been perceived by most Icelanders as a crucial 
development to achieve Iceland’s Arctic ambitions. This cooperation can be 
interpreted as a part of a broader Arctic cooperation strategy, not just for Iceland but 
also for China. However, despite what Lunde describes as an “embrace” of China into 
the Artic, Iceland tries to balance between the pursuit of Arctic ambitions and 
exposing vulnerability to a country that outweighs Iceland in both size, power and 
influence. 
 
5 Russia 
5.1 Russia and the Arctic 
 
‘Russia is a great polar empire’, said Artur Chilingarov, a Russian veteran scientist 
and explorer who had just come back from an expedition in the Arctic Seas in 200780. 
If you take a look at the map of the Arctic Region, there is no doubt that Russia is the 
regional major power; naturally, Russian Arctic policies will have big influence on 
the region.  
 The great Arctic power already caused stirs in the Arctic region during the era 
of the Soviet Union. During a speech in 1987, then Soviet president Mikhail 
Gorbachev called for intergovernmental cooperation in the Arctic. The call for 
cooperation was a response to several factors81;  
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1. The entire North was a part of an important modernization campaign during 
the Soviet era. Most of the seven federal districts and regions are in the 
Northern region and thus strategically important for the Russian Federation. 
2. The vast riches in natural resources, such as minerals and hydrocarbons, make 
the North an important reserve and resource area for the whole Russian 
Federation.  
3. More focus on academia in the Arctic region and also, the need to create an 
academic network to address and redefine the Federation’s role in the Arctic.  
According to Bailes and Heininen (2012), this was a turning point for the Arctic 
region as a whole as Russia is the biggest Arctic country, in both size and share of 
natural resources. However, it would take Russia several decades before developing 
an official Arctic strategy, despite this, Russia was still among the first Arctic nations 
to do so.  
  In 2004, president Vladimir Putin mentions the need to develop an Arctic 
strategy, and in 2008 “Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the 
Arctic in the Period up to 2020 and Beyond” was adopted by the president at the time, 
Dmitry Medvedev, however, it was not made public until 200982. 
 The State Policy has 10 strategic priorities. First, to make Russia seek to settle 
maritime disputes with neighbouring Arctic states in accordance with international 
law; second, to create a search and rescue regime to respond to man-made accidents; 
third, to strengthen bilateral relations through regional organizations such as the 
Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council; fourth, through the 
organizations, to manage cross-polar air routes and the Northern Sea Route more 
effectively for national and international navigation; fifth, to contribute to Arctic 
forums by being active in partnerships; sixth, to determine mutually advantageous 
borders and limits in the Arctic Ocean; seventh, to improve the management of Arctic 
affairs, especially through research; eight, to improve the social and economic 
activities of the indigenous people; ninth, to develop the Arctic into a resource base; 
tenth, to develop and modernize infrastructure83.   
  Although the State Policy very clearly highlights the Russian priorities in the 
Arctic Zone as well as for the entire region, scholars, domestic and foreign alike, are 
unsure how to identify which of these are Russia’s “core priorities”. Bailes and 
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Heininen argue that the Russian State Policy is ‘designed to achieve President Putin’s 
primary aim – the stabilization of the Federation and its economy’84; the Arctic and 
it’s natural resources are important to Russia’s future economic plans. State Policy 
envisions that the Arctic and the northern territories will be Russia’s “leading 
strategic resource base”85. This is seen as a condition for solving challenges of social 
and economic development, such as bridging the gap of socio-economic disparities 
between Russian Arctic regions and the rest of the country86. 
 The State Policy emphasizes that Russia continues its commitment towards 
international law, and that it is necessary to maintain a stable and peaceful 
environment in the Arctic region. To achieve these objectives, Russia seeks to use 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation in areas that provide favourable gains and 
strengthen national security.  
  Although a contradiction in the State Policy, Russia emphasizes that while 
maintaining a peaceful zone, it also wishes to strengthen its military activities in the 
Arctic. Russia is here trying to link energy security with traditional forms of 
security87. According to Konyshev and Sergunin (2012), Russia has assembled an 
Arctic Group of Forces, a general-purpose force whose main assignment is to defend 
territory by executing border controls and patrols along the entire Northern Sea Route. 
The Northern Sea Route is here unique; it has been given the status of a national 
passage and federal line of communications but it can also give Russia major 
economic gains by letting international vessels sail through. The purpose of the Arctic 
Group of Forces is hence to defend Russian territories along with Russian economic 
interests in the region88. 
The 2007 Arctic expedition that is mentioned in the beginning of the chapter 
ultimately became an international public event and received huge media coverage 
outside of Russia as well. At the time, the State Policy had not yet been published and 
the world was anxious to know the Russian standpoint on Arctic affairs. Some 
scholars, such as Howard (2009) argue that, for the rest of the world, this Arctic 
expedition was the Russians expressing their claim of a region that seems to belong to 
no one. It was in line with president Vladimir Putin’s 2004 speech which called for an 
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urgent need to secure its ‘strategic, economic, scientific and defense’ interest. The 
purpose of this expedition was to first, secure geological samples to prove Russian 
territorial claim; secondly, to show the world that Russia has put the Arctic on its 
political agenda89. 
 To other scholars, such as Bailes and Heininen (2012), this expedition was 
‘largely misunderstood and misinterpreted abroad’ and illustrates how ‘an activity 
that is basically scientific can be transformed into a highly (geo) political incident’90. 
It triggered other Arctic nations, such as Denmark and the US, to hastily deploy their 
own Arctic research expeditions to find evidence for their own territorial claims91.  
Before both the 2007 Arctic expedition and the publication of the State Policy, Russia 
has been sending teams on Arctic expeditions annually. Not even the economic crisis 
in 2008 seemed to affect Russian activities in the Arctic. In fact, sharp price increase 
in summer 2008 sent waves of worry among the big oil importing countries, making 
Arctic oil exploration even more lucrative92. Fact remains, with or without the State 
Policy to emphasize it or the 2007 expedition to prove it, Russia is generally viewed 
as an Arctic nation, in some cases even ‘the’ Arctic nation93. As mentioned earlier, 
large parts of Russian territory are situated in the Arctic and so do most of the natural 
resources of the region.  
 According to the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, the 
resources of the Russian Arctic shelf are estimated as equivalent to 83 billion tonnes 
of oil, 80 per cent of which are located in the Barents and Kara seas. The Russian 
Arctic shelf contains between 5 and 9 per cent of Russia’s liquid hydro-carbon 
resources (of which at least 2 per cent is oil) and up to 12.5 per cent of its gas 
resources. The Arctic zone also contains significant onshore resources: the gas 
resources of the Yamal peninsula alone are 505 569 billion cubic metres, while gas 
reserves equal 10 847 billion cubic metres; and oil resources amount to 4144 million 
tonnes, with reserves of 2921 million tonnes94. It is estimated that 81 per cent of total 
Arctic oil production from 2008 to 2030 will come from Russia, while for total Arctic 
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gas production, 94 per cent will come from Russia alone95.  
   Geological explorations of its continental shelf took place already during 
early 1970s Soviet Union; this was soon followed by exploration drilling during the 
1980s. Findings created great expectations and foreign observers predicted immediate 
developments in the next decades. These expectations were more strongly felt abroad, 
because, domestically, development of offshore exploration received little support 
from both institutions and politicians alike. According to Claes and Moe, many 
foreign observers forget that the Soviet Union carried out long-term mapping of their 
resources, meaning big discoveries do not necessarily imply immediate developments. 
Additionally at the time, the Soviet Union had significant onshore resources; offshore 
exploration was thus not a priority96. It would then take Russia several decades before 
Arctic offshore exploration would come back on the political agenda.  
  In line with Putin’s policy of nationalizing the oil and gas sector since the 
2000s, the Russian government has given state controlled companies the position to 
play a leading role in the exploitation of energy resources from continental shelf to 
the Arctic region. From 2008, in order to gain exclusive rights to new offshore 
licenses, the companies need to have a state majority and at least 5 years of 
experience working on the Russian continental shelf. Finally, the only companies that 
qualified were Gazprom and Rosneft. By then end of 2013, these two state companies 
were granted licenses that made up 80 per cent of the Russian Arctic shelf. Although 
lastly, just because of the amount of licenses granted, it was clear that a significant 
amount of resources was necessary for the companies to meet the amount of work 
they had to carry out97.  
 In sum, during the early 2000s, energy security came back on the political 
agenda, reflecting global trends; the emergence of big oil importers such as China and 
India sent sparks of speculations on future supply shortage. Continued high price of 
energy and natural resources and Arctic thawing created strong expectations about the 
new opportunities on Russian soil. In the early years, Russia focussed on territorial 
claims. However, Russia has thus far respected the territorial claims set in accordance 
with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Russia 
has already gained large areas of the Arctic Ocean in accordance with UNCLOS and 
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thus Russia will continue to respect the Convention rather than question its 
legitimacy. The Russian Federation’s biggest interest in the Arctic is primarily 
economic, as the region makes about 11 per cent of the Federation’s income98. From 
the outside it seems like Russia is responding to changing geopolitical environment, 
but according to Bailes and Heininen, it is Russia taking an advantage of the changes 
in the Arctic to fit with their priorities in domestic politics99. 
 
5.2 Russia and China 
 
Oil and gas exploration outside national jurisdiction is a very lucrative business for 
energy companies. They can choose which projects they wish to invest in, using their 
capital and technology as leverage. When states cannot be in direct control of the 
production, they usually seek foreign companies. In order to gain revenue from the 
production, states use taxation to claim parts of the profit. It seems like a win-win 
situation; foreign companies get access and the possibility to invest in upstream oil 
production, while governments, who control the resources, gain profit coming from 
the production. Also, here in the case of Russian resource development, there is a 
tighter control as both foreign companies and private Russian companies are only 
allowed to work on the shelf in cooperation with Gazprom or Rosneft100. 
 As mentioned above, the two Russian state companies now have the control of 
most of the licenses on Russian territory. However, neither Rosneft nor Gazprom has 
the experience, capital or technology to develop production. Traditionally, Russia has 
a longer experience with Europe as an energy-trading partner. Western countries are 
Russia’s primary energy market, and in return, Western companies provide Russian 
companies with necessary investment partners, expertise and technology101. However, 
after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, diplomatic relations between Russia 
and Western countries deteriorated. This led to Western sanctions against Russia, and 
eventually preventing any cooperation between Western and Russian companies102. 
Around the same time, Russian and Chinese diplomatic relations began developing 
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and currently, both Russian and Chinese described their current relations as ‘the best 
in history’.  
Europe has been Russia’s biggest energy market for several decades. Because of this 
trade, Russia has not been looking towards China as contracts with European 
countries yielded more profit and flexibility. And unlike China, pipelines and 
infrastructure needed to transfer gas to the European continent are also finished 
projects. Russia needs the European market; the European market counts for 67 
percent of Russia's gas exports and 69 percent of Russia's oil exports103. Disruption in 
this trade would affect Russia’s income and budget drastically. Thus, Russian policy 
documents have periodically expressed a need and desire to tap the Asian energy 
market and to attract investments from Asia. The countries in focus were not only 
China but also the other energy giants; India, Japan and South Korea. According to a 
report from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the Russian 
government published an energy strategy in 2003 where it predicted that the Asian 
market would by 2020, constitute a huge chunk of the Russian hydrocarbon export. 
By 2020, Asia is to account for 30 per cent of Russia’s oil exports and 25 per cent of 
natural gas exports104.  
 Talks of energy trade with China thus took place before the Western 
sanctions; Rosneft and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed what 
was then thought to be the biggest Sino-Russian energy deal, worth an estimated $270 
billion. So for the next 25 years, Rosneft is to provide CNPC with about 365 million 
tons of oil105. Another historic energy deal was made in 2014: a 30-year energy 
agreement, estimated at $400 billion. Leaders of both states, Presidents Vladimir 
Putin and Xi Jinping signed this historical deal securing CNPC and its subsidiary 
PetroChina, natural gas supplies for the next 30 years106.  
  As for energy investments in the Arctic, in 2013, Novatek granted CNPC a 
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20% stake in its LNG project on the Yamal Peninsula, earning CNCP an import of 
about 3 million tons of natural gas annually107.  
The closer diplomatic relations between Moscow and Beijing has had great influence 
on the countries’ energy politics. In Xi Jinping’s first visit abroad, which was to 
Moscow in March 2013, he came home with the 2013 energy deal and an agreement 
that allows CNPC to do joint exploration of Arctic waters with Rosneft. Energy deals 
between China and Russia have had strong political overtones and it is obvious that a 
further strengthening of Sino-Russian relations receives great support high up in the 
political sphere as well as among prominent energy figures108.  
According to Klimenko, much of Russia’s success as a major energy state is thanks to 
Rosneft’s president Igor Sechin; he is also an influential figure in Russian politics. 
Sechin envisions shaping Rosneft into a ‘major global oil company’, but this is an 
aspiration that requires both cash and capital109.  
  Sechin, has been in touch with several prominent Chinese figures, such as 
CNPC’s Zhou Jiping and the director of the National Energy Administration of the 
People's Republic of China, Wu Xinxiong. On Rosneft’s own press pages, these talks 
emphasise satisfaction with the cooperation and promote expansion of partnerships110. 
Despite continued media coverage about continued warm relations between Russia 
and China, many scholars are now questioning for how long this romance is going to 
last111. Also, will Russia let China have a bigger stake in the Arctic? So far most 
scholars say that there are more complications to this relationship than what most 
media portray. 
 First of all, there is already great mistrust between Russia and China; China 
has in the last decades built qualities that create a bigger leverage when negotiating 
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with Russia, such as heavy investment in technological developments112.  
 Second, in a survey conducted among young Russians, more and more young 
people in Russia identify themselves culturally closer to Western Europe and Moscow 
will just grow further away from Beijing as cultural differences occur. In the early 
years of PRC, Beijing’s relations with Moscow were good, but, historically, China 
has always held a junior position. Today, China sees itself as a more equal partner 
next to Russia and uses the term ‘partnership between equals’. Both the Chinese 
government and Chinese corporations are more than aware of the fact that although 
Russia seems to be warming up to China, Moscow will still take precautions as to not 
let the balance fall into China’s favour113.  
  Cooperation between Russia and China seems to be taking great steps, but in 
truth, it is a more pragmatic relationship where both are still being wary of the other 
part’s intentions. In order to maintain a sustained and steady economic growth in the 
backdrop in the global financial crisis, Russia will not ignore a possible cooperation 
with China114. However, the grand expectations that media have of Sino-Russian 
relations will most likely not take place, but both will most likely try to find a 
common ground to nurture the interest on both sides of the border. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
During the 2000s, energy and energy security was back on the political agenda as 
China emerged as a major energy consumer. The seemingly unlimited thirst for 
energy combined with a peak in oil prices created a global presumption that a new oil 
crisis would emerge. China’s thirst for energy is not something that is unusual, all 
developing countries, especially those that grow at a rapid pace, experience an 
unprecedented need for energy as energy is a necessity in a country’s economic 
growth. And unlike the US who is becoming less dependent on energy import, China 
is desperate for more as Chinese energy production cannot keep up with Chinese 
consumption. So China does what most other industrial countries did; China went 
abroad. In search for additional energy reserves, China had to tap into untapped 
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regions of the world, such as South America and Africa. Some of the countries that 
China has approached are considered rogue states, and the political fallout following 
these initiatives has created a global wariness of Chinese businesses abroad.  
 
This study attempted to describe Chinese energy politics in the Arctic by looking 
closely into Chinese foreign policy, Russian Arctic policy and Icelandic Arctic policy.  
Trends in Chinese foreign policy show that China has been careful in dealing 
with foreign policy. As a country with almost no allies, China is alienated in a global 
world order where American liberal democracy is the norm. China represents a 
differentness that its foreign relations do not have experience with. China is very 
flexible in its decision-making process and Chinese policy makers have yet to decide 
on an international strategic identity that Beijing should pursue; these factors make 
China a wild card on the international arena and a partner most states are hesitant of 
collaborating with.  
  China does have a clear cut state policy and its strategic identity in Asia is 
quite distinct. However, like Cohen says in his book; it is not easy to compare 
Chinese foreign relations in one region and compare it with an other. Based on the 
findings in chapter 2, we can see that Chinese foreign policy is becoming more 
complex and multi faceted.  This study has given us the opportunity to observe how 
China interacts with both a big state and a small state in a region outside of Asia.  
 
From the data collected from chapter 3, 4 and 5, we can draw two conclusions:  
 
1. China is the most visible non-Arctic actor in Arctic affairs; this is because 
China is the partner that compliments the political needs and priorities of the 
Arctic states the most. 
 
China could offer technology, human resources and capital required. In conclusion, 
China’s contribution to Arctic development could only benefit the Arctic states115. 
  In the last decades, there have been great geopolitical shifts, but these shifts 
are not coming as a direct consequence of Chinese policy making. Global warming, 
financial recession and the US’ retreat from Iceland changed the geopolitical situation 
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in Iceland. Multiple outside actors approached Iceland but finally it was China that 
gained most access to the little island state. This was not because China played a “big 
power-small power” game with Iceland, but because China had what was needed to 
suit Icelandic political priorities. China has the capital necessary to develop the newly 
discovered natural resources found on Icelandic territory. China is still Asia-Pacific’s 
biggest consumer of energy and these energy investments are to China long-term 
investments. Thus China has qualities that best suit Icelandic circumstances; enough 
capital and again enough capital and time to wait for the projects to bear fruits. 
  This is also applicable in Chinese activities in Russia. The political fall out 
after Crimea was not the sole reason for why Moscow decided to strengthen its 
political ties with Beijing. Russia was looking towards the East before 2014 and the 
Western sanctions were more like what ignited the Russian shift towards the East. 
Like mentioned, this resulted with bilateral agreements in 2013 and 2014 between 
Russia and China, which are both long-term agreements. 
2. China is not attempting to make geopolitical shifts in the Arctic; instead, 
China promotes scientific and institutional cooperation.  
 
China sees the downside of instability in a world where it depends on resources from 
around the world. That is why alongside making bilateral agreements with specific 
states, China is also increasingly becoming more active in international institutions. 
The Arctic region and in particular the Arctic Council are becoming a new political 
hub with prominent members such as the US and Russia. As a great power, it would 
only be natural for China to partake in that political community. China applied for 
observer status in the AC early on and that is in line with both Icelandic and Russian 
stance in the region. Both Iceland and Russia have put regional cooperation through 
the AC as one their Arctic strategy priority. Just like China, being a big country 
dependent on trade, Russia has more to gain on having peaceful cooperation with the 
other Arctic states. And in Iceland there is a broad consensus among elites, the public 
and the scientists that Arctic matters concerns all. Although, the strongest incentive 
for the strengthening of the AC authority is to prevent Iceland from being excluded 
from the region as Iceland is situated just outside the polar circle.  
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In accordance with Cohen’s four pillar of power, China does not possess enough in 
order to make a geopolitical shift in the Arctic.  
 Chinese has formulated a number of non-negotiable core interests (国家的核
心利益): these policies are pursued more aggressively by Beijing and the stances on 
these policies are much more clear cut. These core interests are regional ones and 
Beijing is clearer about these in its rhetoric. Thus, if Arctic and Arctic strategy were 
political priorities for China, a public strategy would already have been formulated. 
Instead in 2009, the Chinese Assistant Manager of Foreign Affairs Hu Zhengyue 
announced publically that China does not have an Artic strategy and is thus not a 
priority at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs116. In sum, China will not use 
military power to pursue its interests in the Arctic. 
The analysis in this thesis shows that China can only execute economic power in 
both Iceland and Russia, but only to a certain degree. Both Iceland and Russia takes 
measure to prevent China from having too much influence in their state affairs. 
Chinese corporates can only cooperate with Russian national companies, in which the 
Russian Federation has control of. As on Iceland, scientific and economic 
cooperation, which are transparent and beneficial for both parts, are widely accepted, 
but other cases such as Huang Nubo are not.  
 
Finally, to answer the research questions posed in the beginning of the study: How 
does China and Chinese politics fit with these two Arctic countries’ strategy and what 
sort of role do the activities in the Arctic have in Chinese energy politics? 
 
To many of the Arctic states, cooperation with China might yield more advantages 
than disadvantages. This is especially true in the case of Iceland. Recent events in 
international politics have enabled China to approach the Arctic states, and China has 
not been pushing aggressively on any of the Arctic states. This is in line with Chinese 
own policy of non-interference and respect for sovereignty. China will neither push 
for a great geopolitical shift by using military power. First of all, China is not a 
military super power, because Chinese military does not expand far from China’s own 
borders. Its power rest on economy and it is this power that China uses when 
negotiating with foreign partners. Additionally, as seen in the empirical evidence 
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presented in this thesis, China’s foreign partners do take measures to ensure that they 
are in control of their own resources, and these are terms that China so far has 
accepted.   
Despite the gigantic energy deals signed between Russia and China, and despite 
China being the first non-Arctic country to receive an oil license in Iceland, the Arctic 
is just a part of a bigger energy security strategy. Chinese foreign policy has 
emphasised cross-diplomatic relations. The Arctic seems an ideal region as Arctic 
policy is currently based on consensus politics. The chance of a political backlash is 
much smaller in the Arctic than elsewhere where China do business, despite that the 
profit in the Arctic is not as big. It is just a matter of opportunities that have opened 
up for China, which seized them.  
 
This thesis sheds light on two very current issues, Arctic affairs and Chinese foreign 
diplomacy. This study proves that both topics are very complex and not easy to 
investigate, hence such subjects cannot be exhaustively studied through a single 
thesis. Due to limited time and also limited resources, this thesis focus only on 
Chinese energy politics and Icelandic and Russian Arctic strategy. If possible, it 
would have been ideal to do a further investigation on the Arctic strategies of both 
Denmark (Greenland) and Norway also to have a bigger picture of Chinese overall 
approach in the Arctic Circle. Another interesting finding that could also have been 
further developed; what is the relationship between Chinese energy companies and 
the Chinese state. So far, most of the energy cooperation between China and the 
Arctic states has been between national energy companies, and much less private 
companies.  
When they invest in energy projects outside of China, are they doing it as a part of a 
commercial partner on the global market? Or are they just an extension of Beijing’s 
reach?    
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